Saving and Bequest in China: An Analysis of Intergenerational Exchange. by Almås, Ingvild et al.
This series consists of papers with limited circulation, intended to stimulate discussion.
Discussion paper
DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS
INSTITUTT  FOR  SAMFUNNSØKONOMI
ISSN:  0804-6824
SAM 10 2016
May 2016
Saving and Bequest in China:
An Analysis of Intergenerational 
Exchange
BY
Ingvild Almås, Eleonora Freddi, AND Øystein Thøgersen
Saving and Bequest in China:
An Analysis of Intergenerational Exchange
Ingvild Alma˚s
IIES, Stockholm University
and Norwegian School of Economics
ingvild.almas@iies.se.su
Eleonora Freddi
Stockholm School of Economics
eleonora.freddi@phdstudent.hhs.se
Øystein Thøgersen
Norwegian School of Economics
oystein.thogersen@nhh.no
Abstract
Particularly high saving rates among the elderly in both rural and urban China call for
an investigation of the involved bequest motive. Utilizing unique survey data from a diverse
group of Chinese households, we document that the magnitude of the bequest from parent to
child is synchronized with the level of personal assistance from child to parent. Moreover, both
bequest and assistance are increasing in the parent’s income and decreasing in the child’s income.
Comparing with the prediction from a stylized overlapping generations model, these findings are
consistent with an exchange-based bequest motive. This conclusion has implications for how
public policies and transfer schemes may be designed in order to contribute to the government
objective of increased private consumption. Our results indicate that an important driver for
our result is the housing wealth as part of the bequest.
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1 Introduction
The ongoing spectacular transition of the Chinese economy has so far been characterized by per-
sistent high output growth and gross domestic saving rates exceeding 50 per cent of GDP the last
decade. Consumption as a share of GDP has remained low, and private consumption is still barely
above 35 per cent of GDP, despite the fact that Chinese authorities have explicitly highlighted an
ambition to stimulate consumption growth.1
In order to predict future Chinese saving patterns and to design efficient policies stimulating
consumption, an understanding of the relevant saving motives is called for. Utilizing unique survey
data collected through personal interviews of elderly people in China, this paper attempts to con-
tribute to this understanding by zooming in on the importance of an exchange-based bequest motive
1The ambitions of the Chinese Authorities to stimulate consumption growth were, for example, made
very explicit during the opening of the Chinese National People’s Congress in March 2013, see http :
//www.cnbc.com/id/100520513.
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and how this interacts with households’ savings decisions. According to such a bequest motive,
which has received a lot of attention since the seminal paper on “strategic bequest” by Bernheim
et al. (1985), the elderly engage in an intentional exchange of bequest in return for received “assis-
tance” from their children. Assistance refers broadly to time devoted to care and supply of other
partly non-marketable services from children to parents. A preference for receiving assistance in old
age and a low supply of substitutes offered by the public sector are likely to increase the life-cycle
savings of forward-looking households.
Several observations suggest that bequest motives may be quantitatively important for house-
hold saving in China. First, there is evidence that the elderly, even though they are in the last part
of their life cycle, have very high savings rates. Several previous papers have documented that urban
households seem to have a “U-shaped” age-savings profile (see, e.g., Chamon and Prasad (2010),
Chamon et al. (2013), Song and Yang (2010), Choukhmane et al. (2013), Curtis et al. (2011), Ge et
al. (2012), Chamon and Prasad (2010), Chen (2014)). For example, based on panel data from the
Chinese Urban Household Survey, Chamon and Prasad (2010: 103) show that the average saving
rate for urban “household heads” in 2004 is at a 0.25-0.3 level for those in their mid-twenties, then
it drops to a level of 0.15-0.2 for those in their late forties and then it again jumps to a stable
0.25-0.3 level for those aged 50 and above. In this paper we calculate age specific savings rates for
2007 in both urban and rural areas using Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP) data. The
analysis of these confirms the “U-shaped profile” for urban areas and establishes a similar saving
age profile in rural areas.
Moreover, the joint effects of cultural factors, less developed credit markets and a smaller
welfare state may also explain an important role for bequests in China based on an intentional
intergenerational exchange potentially rooted in strategic considerations over the life cycle. On
the one hand, we note that a scarce provision of basic public services and a less developed social
security system imply that most elderly Chinese rely on their children for care and support, see
Banerjee et al. (2010). This is consistent with a traditional self-reliance within Chinese families
(see e.g., Yin (2010)). Indeed, while the typical co-residence between parents and their son’s family
gradually becomes outdated in modern China, family ties are still tight. Parents and their son’s
family locate strategically in order to maintain a close relationship and to offer necessary care and
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support to the elderly (Yan, 2010).
On the other hand, it seems that bequest and other inter-vivos intergenerational transfers are
important for the children in the first stages of their adult life when they make their first housing
investments and get married. This partly reflects that the homes of the majority of Chinese
households are privately owned, i.e. all rural households live in private homes while the share of
urban households living in privately owned homes increased to above 80 per cent after housing
market reforms during 1990s, see Wang and Murie (2000); Wang et al. (2005) and evidence from
previous CHIP data rounds (1995 and 2002). In our survey data on the elderly, 90% of respondents
own the house where they reside and 97% of house owners have zero debt. Taking into account that
the credit market is less developed and only a small fraction of the house owners has a mortgage,
we conjecture that bequests, which may involve transfer of housing wealth, are quantitatively
important for the young generation’s financing of their housing investments.
As a point of departure, this paper presents a stylized theoretical overlapping generations model
where an exchange-based bequest motive is modeled by means of a Nash bargain between parent
and child, see Cox et al. (1998) for a similar bargaining approach to inter-vivos intergenerational
transfers. If the adult has a preference for receiving assistance, this intuitively increases bequests
and, in response, assistance. In turn, this will imply that forward-looking adults increase their
life-cycle savings in order to afford satisfactory levels of both assistance and consumption in old
age. We demonstrate that both bequest and assistance are increasing functions of the parent’s
income and decreasing functions of the child’s income. These synchronized responses in bequest
and assistance will not be present in the case of only a purely altruistic bequest motive.
As the aim of this paper is to zoom in on the exchange-based motive, we need detailed data
on the relationship within families, the time spent on assistance, and financial conditions and
transfers; and we were unable to find existing data sources that included all these variables. The
CHIP data were suitable to describe urban and rural savings profiles. In that respect they serve as
the motivation for our theoretical exercise and the empirical investigation of this paper. In order
to obtain the additional information on bequests, bequests motives, assistance, co-habitation, and
transfer of house and financial wealth, we collected, in collaboration with Hycon Resarch, our own
survey data in four regions of China. The data are based on interviews with 600 elderly above
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the age of 50. We cover rural and urban areas in Shanghai, located at the east coast of China,
and Chengdu, located in the western inland province of Sichuan. The sample-selection reflects an
attempt to capture both rural and urban, and coastal and inland, areas. We know that China is
a populous country with extensive differences between both urban and rural part and coastal and
inland areas. The regional coverage was chosen in order to represent the population of elderly in all
these four, potentially different, areas. Our data include rather detailed information about income,
wealth, demographics, actual and planned intergenerational transfers and bequests, and the level
of assistance provided from children to parents.
The empirical analysis reveals that there is a positive relationship between assistance provided
by the child and expected bequests, a relationship that is consistent with an exchange-based motive.
Moreover, the data allow us to test the predictions that savings and assistance are increasing in the
parent’s income and decreasing in the child’s income. Our data are by and large consistent with
these predictions and as such give support for the exchange-based motive of savings and bequests.2
Interestingly, it seems that transfer of housing wealth is key in understanding the exchange-based
motive.
Our analysis adds to the literature on private consumption in China. Recent contributions
explain the high household saving rates with reference to factors like financing of health expendi-
tures, education of children and housing investments, see Chamon and Prasad (2010). According
to Choukhmane et al. (2013), the importance of some of these factors for household savings rates
seems to be due to their interaction with the Chinese demographic structure caused by the one-child
policy.
Another recent study highlights the importance of precautionary savings. Chamon et al. (2013)
present evidence which indicate that the combination of a lowered replacement rate in the old age
pension system and higher income uncertainty may contribute to the explanation of a significant
part of the “U-shaped” age-saving profile. Although these studies are important in order to under-
stand the observed savings patterns in China, our empirical study indicates that an exchange-based
bequest motive also matters for the magnitude of household savings.
2We are not able to conclude robustly on all testable implications of the model, however, as not all point estimates
are statistically significant. We suspect that this may be related to our moderate sample size.
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In general, intergenerational transfers in the form of inter-vivos transfers from children to elderly
parents have also received attention in the literature. A study of Silverstein et al. (2006) indicates
that the majority of parents have received transfers from at least one of their children. On the
other hand, Yan (2003) argues that specific events like marriage are expected to trigger significant
downward transfers. Cong (2008) even suggests that a child’s willingness to provide assistance and
care to the parents in old age will depend on earlier downward transfers. Downward transfers in
the form of bequests have not received much assistance so far, however.
In the next section we establish the facts regarding age and savings in China. Section three
presents our theoretical model and derives the theoretical predictions. Section four presents our
data set and offers some descriptive statistics. The empirical analysis is presented in section five.
Section six concludes and discusses our findings in light of potential attempts to boost private
consumption and with respect to how the ongoing transformation of the Chinese society may
impact the intergenerational mechanisms analyzed in this paper.
2 Saving patterns in China
The Chinese savings-age profile attracts attention both because it does not confirm implications
from the most standard models of life-cycle savings, see Ando and Modigliani (1963), and Friedman
(1963), and because it is different from the better known profiles observed in OECD countries.3
As our own data collection focuses on the elderly households only, we use an external data source
to establish the savings profile. The Chinese Household Income Project (CHIP) has conducted four
waves of household surveys, in 1988, 1995, 2002, and lastly 2007. These surveys were carried out as
part of a collaborative research project on incomes and inequality in China organized by Chinese
and international researchers, with assistance from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS).4
All the CHIP waves contain surveys of urban and rural households. As we are not aware that
3Note that the “U-shaped” profile has also been documented for some other developing countries, whereas other
developing countries seems to have a flatter or opposite u-shape (see e.g., Attanasio and Sze´kely (2000)). As there
are many country specific factors that can explain observed savings patterns, and since we have collected detailed
data in China only, we do not make any attempt to explain general trends in savings patterns in developing countries
or countries in economic transition. However, the intuitions from this paper may be useful as a starting point for
studying other countries’ savings profiles as well.
4For documentation about the CHIP data see Eichen and Zhang (1993), Li et al. (2008) and Luo et al. (2013).
The CHIP surveys are closely related to the NBS household survey (see Li et al. (2008) for a description of the NBS
household surveys).
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Table 1: Household savings rates
30 and less 31-49 years 50 and above
China Urban 33.8 29.5 34.0
China Rural 14.1 10.4 19.8
United States 12.8 23.5 16.6
Note: The table displays the household savings rates for different age groups in urban and rural areas, respectively,
in 2007. The household age group is defined by age of household head. The data are taken from the CHIP data and
savings are defined as household total income minus household total consumption expenditure. The numbers for the
United States are based on the CEX data downloaded from http://www.bls.gov/cex/csxshare.htm, 16.11.2015.
the age-savings profile for rural areas has been previously documented, the possibility of including
these areas was important when choosing to use the CHIP data. This comes at the cost of having to
deal with cross-sectional data and we may worry about potential cohort effects in the cross-sectional
representation of savings-age profiles. However, it is comforting that previous studies have shown
that similar age profiles exist when using panel data for urban areas (see e.g., Chamon and Prasad
(2010); Chamon et al. (2013); Song and Yang (2010); Yang et al. (2012).
Table 1 displays the savings rates for three age groups in China for 2007 5 and compares it to
the corresponding numbers from the United States using the Consumer Expenditure (CEX) data.
Savings rates are calculated as the deviation between household income and household expenditure
divided by household income. As we can see from the table both the young and the elderly save
larger fractions of their income than the middle-aged.
The high savings rates among the young can be explained by credit constraints (see e.g., Deaton
(1992)). If the young cannot borrow to finance their education or other expenses, they may save
early in life although they would have preferred to borrow and consequently smooth consumption
over their life-cycle if they could. The explanations for the high saving rates among the elderly
is not that obvious though. Candidate explanations are precautionary savings (see e.g., Chamon
and Prasad (2010); Chamon et al. (2013)) and in particular the effects of the one-child policy
(Choukhmane et al., 2013; Curtis et al., 2011; Ge et al., 2012). However, our analysis suggests
an additional explanation. We find support for exchange-based bequest motives, and our results
indicate that these motives contribute significantly to the explanation of the high savings rate
5Note that similar patterns arise using the CHIP 1995 and 2002 data although the profile is quite flat in rural
China for 1995.
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among the elderly.
3 Theoretical framework
Building on the basic contributions of Bernheim et al. (1985) and Cox (1987), we formalize an
exchange-based bequest motive and compare it with the benchmark case of an altruistic motive.
Our stylized model is extended to explicitly capture how intertemporal savings decisions take the
future intergenerational exchange of bequest for assistance into account. Moreover, we assume that
this exchange is determined by Nash bargaining as in Cox et al. (1998).
The parent-generation and their children overlap in one period and each representative parent
has one representative child. While the parent has a two-period life span, i.e. the parent lives in
period 1 and 2, the child lives in period 2 only.6 The parent participates inelastically in the labor
force in period 1 and is retired in period 2. The child participates inelastically in the labor force
in period 2. Wage incomes are exogenously given by wp for the parent and wk for the child. For
simplicity we assume that both the real interest rate and the utility discount factor are zero.
Working backwards, the parent and child interact in period 2 in the sense that the child provides
a certain number of time units of assistance, a, to the old parent, while the parent leaves a bequest,
B, to the child. In period 1, the parent’s saving decision is based on perfect foresight about the
outcome of this bargain.
The period 2 utility of the parent Up,2, and the child, Uk,2, are given by
Up,2 = u(cp,2) + f(a) + α
(
u(ck,2) + v(L)
)
, (1)
Uk,2 = u(ck,2) + v(L) + γ
(
u(cp,2) + f(a)
)
, (2)
where u′ > 0, u′′ < 0, f ′ > 0, f ′′ ≤ 0, v′ > 0, v′′ ≤ 0 and v(0) = f(0) = 0. As in Cox et al. (1998),
the parameters α and γ capture the degree of altruism, 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1. The period 2
consumption of the parent and the child, cp,2 and ck,2, and the leisure of the child, L, are given by
cp,2 = s−B, (3)
ck,2 = wk +B, (4)
6In terms of demographic structure, this is similar to the framework utilized by Persson and Tabellini (1990: page
166).
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L = L− a, (5)
where s is saving which is given by the parent’s decision in period 1 and L is the exogenous total
time-endowment of the child after we have subtracted the inelastic labor market supply.
Abstracting from potential problems related to parents’ ability to commit to the derived bequest,
the solution to the bargaining problem is given by the maximization of
N = (Up,2 − U0p,2)(Uk,2 − U0k,2), (6)
with respect to a and B, taking into account that 0 ≤ a ≤ L. The threat-points U0p,2 and U0k,2
capture a situation without any exchange, i.e. B = 0, a = 0 and, hence, L = L. It follows from
(1)-(5) that
U0p,2 = u(s) + α
(
u(wk) + L
)
, (7a)
U0k,2 = u(wk) + v(L) + γ
(
u(s)
)
. (7b)
Utilizing (1)-(7), we can write the first-order conditions
(
f ′(a)− αv′(L))(Uk,2 − U0k,2) + (− v′(L) + γf ′(a))(Up,2 − U0p,2) = 0, (8)
(
u′(cp,2) + αu′(ck,2)
)(
Uk,2 − U0k,2
)
+
(
u′(ck,2)− γu′(cp,2)
)(
Up,2 − U0p,2
)
= 0. (9)
3.1 Altruism
Specifying α = γ = 1 yields the benchmark case of complete, two-sided altruism. From (8) and (9)
we obtain
u′(cp,2) = u′(ck,2), (10)
v′(L) = f ′(a), (11)
implying a separation between the decisions of a and B.7 It follows from (3), (4) and (10) that the
optimal B serves to smooth the consumption level of the child and the parent, i.e. cp,2 = ck,2, and
B =
s− wk
2
. (12)
7These first-order conditions in the case of altruism can equivalently be derived without any reference to bargaining.
Adopting a traditional definition of two-sided altruism as in Foster and Rosenzweig (2001), we can assume that i)
the parent decides the optimal B from the maximization of the sum of own direct utility and the child’s direct utility
and ii) that the child decides the optimal a from the maximization of the sum of own direct utility and the parent’s
direct utility. It is straightforward to show that this leads to the same first-order-conditions, i.e. (10) and (11).
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On the other hand, (11) determines a, which hinges solely on the magnitude of L and the curvature
of the utility functions f(·) and v(·), but is independent of wk, s and in turn wp.
The period 1 problem of the parent in the case of altruism is given by the maximization of his
own lifetime utility and the utility of the child,
Up,1 = u(cp,1) + u(cp,2) + u(ck,2) + v(L) + f(a), (13)
with respect to s, given (3), (4), (12), and the insight that L and a are independent of s. We obtain
the first-order condition
u′(cp,1) =
1
2
u′(cp,2) +
1
2
u′(ck,2). (14)
This implies that consumption is smoothed both over time and between generations, i.e. ck,2 =
cp,2 = cp,1, and
s =
1
3
(2wp − wk). (15)
Based on (11), (12) and (15), the comparative static properties of the model in the case of
altruism are:
∂B
∂wk
=
1
2
(
∂s
∂wk
− 1
)
= −2
3
,
∂B
∂wp
=
1
2
∂s
∂wp
=
1
3
,
∂a
∂wk
=
∂a
∂wp
= 0 (16)
3.2 Exchange
Turning to exchange motive, we specify α = γ = 0 in (8) and (9), implying
f ′(a)
v′(L)
=
u′(cp,2)
u′(ck,2)
=
Up,2 − U0p,2
Uk,2 − U0k,2
. (17)
In order to derive illuminating closed-form solutions to the bargaining problem in this case, we
assume that the utility of consumption is logarithmic, u(cp,2) = log(cp,2) and u(ck,2) = log(ck,2),
while the utility functions for a and L are linear, f(a) = a and v(L) = L. From (17), this allows
us to solve for optimal B and a,
B =
s− wk
2
, (18)
a =
log s− logwk
2
(19)
We observe from (12) and (18) that the optimal B is the same as in the case of altruism. As we
observe from (19), the distinction is that the exchange motive implies that not only B but also a
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is increasing in s and decreasing in wk. The intuition is straightforward. From the point of view
of the parent, both consumption, cp,2, and assistance, a, are normal goods. Consequently, a higher
s from the previous period, is in period 2 smoothed optimally between cp,2 and a by means of the
response in B. For the child, a higher wage income is smoothed between consumption, ck,2 , and
leisure, L, reducing the supply of assistance and the corresponding bequest received.
In period 1, the parent has perfect foresight about the bargaining in period 2 and maximizes
Up,1 = log cp,1 + log cp,2 + a (20)
with respect to s. Here
cp,1 = wp − s. (21)
Substituting from (4), (18), (19) and (21) into (20), we derive the first-order condition
1
wp − s =
1
s+ wk
+
1
2s
, (22)
and it is now straightforward to demonstrate that 0 < ∂s∂wp < 1 and −1 < ∂s∂wk < 0. Using these
derivatives, (18) and (19), we obtain the comparative static properties of the model in the case of
exchange-based bequest:
∂B
∂wk
=
1
2
(
∂s
∂wk
− 1
)
∈
(
−1,−1
2
)
,
∂B
∂wp
=
1
2
∂s
∂wp
∈
(
0,
1
2
)
,
∂a
∂wk
=
1
2
(
1
s
∂s
∂wk
− 1
wk
)
< 0,
∂a
∂wp
=
(
1
2s
)(
∂s
∂wp
)
> 0.
(23)
Comparing (23) to (16), we observe that the key to disentangle between the alternative bequest
motives is the sensitivity of a to wk and wp in the case of exchange-based bequest. The exchange
motive implies that a higher wk not only increases the child’s demand for ck,2, and leisure, L, but
also leads the forward-looking parent to save less early in life in response to a higher implicit price
of a in terms of B. Moreover, a higher wp triggers a positive saving response which reflects higher
demand for both cp,2 and a. Intuitively, all these effects imply that any variation in wk, wp and in
turn s, creates positively synchronized movements in a and B.
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4 Data collection and descriptives
Our survey was carried out from March until May 2012 in collaboration with Hycon Research
in Shanghai.8 The survey consisted of face-to-face interviews with elderly people aged 50-80.
Professional local interviewers visited the individuals at their homes and read each question from
the questionnaire to the respondent. The questionnaire spanned topics from personal information
and demographics to income and occupation, as well as saving behavior and net wealth. A section
was explicitly devoted to information on the respondent’s children and on bequests and other
intergenerational economic and non-economic transfers.
The interviews were conducted in both urban and rural areas of Shanghai and Chengdu. The
former city is located on the coast, while the latter lies in the middle of China, in Sichuan province.
The choice of these two locations was driven by the regional differences between the two cities
which allows us to derive better predictions for China. Moreover, the distinction between urban
and rural areas provides further variation across the individual responses. A multistage random
cluster sampling was carried out within these four geographical areas. Districts within the four
areas were chosen and divided in subareas which were then randomly picked for the interviews.
In order to avoid residential segregation, the four poorest and four richest districts in the four
areas were excluded. Within each cluster we opted for a quota-based sampling. A fixed amount of
150 respondents per area was established, as well as a 60-70% quota for the proportion of retired
respondents and a 5% quota for each 5-year age group. Finally, a pre-determined “random walk”
was used to choose the households to interview along the streets of the districts in order to avoid
interactions with neighboring houses.
After a pilot survey we introduced screening questions in order to ensure a sufficient response
rate. In particular, the respondents had to be above 50, have at least one child aged above 18
and be willing to share detailed information about their financial situation in order to be part of
the survey. Eventually, given the quotas and the exclusion through screening questions, we got a
sample of 600 responses satisfying these criteria.9
8While conducting the survey we were also benefitting from the collaboration with Fudan University and Antai
School of Management at Shanghai Jiaotong University.
9The total number of non respondents is 4072 and the total exclusions during screening is 1785.
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From the data collected we construct variables for our empirical investigation. Questions on
bequests and on child’s characteristics were asked for each child of the respondent. This allows us to
construct variables which are child specific and to enlarge the sample size to 910 (although clustering
at household level is necessary). In particular, we use two different measures for expected bequest.
One is based on the intention to leave a bequest, while the other is constructed as the (predicted)
stock of savings at the (expected) death of the parent. The first measure (ExpectedBequest) is
the sum of the appropriate amount of bequest (Bequest) and non-monetary gifts (Inkind bequest)
intended for a specific child, the amount of inter-vivos transfers from the parent to the child
(Intervivos) and the economic value of the house (House). The latter is added only if the respondent
is owner of the house and if he/she intends to leave the house to that specific child. The value
of the house is divided by the respondent’s number of children.10 The amount of inter-vivos are
future/intended transfers to the child for education, wedding and the purchase of the house for the
child.
The second measure for expected bequest (Tot savings at death) is instead the sum of the
stock of savings at the (expected) death of the parent (Savings at death) and the value of the
house (House). Both measures are divided by the number of the respondent’s children. The stock
of savings is based on a question asking specifically the amount of the respondent and his/her
spouse’s total savings, including cash holdings, deposits in financial institutions, private savings
associations, government bonds, as well as stocks/funds. From this question we get a measure of
the stock of total savings. To predict the age of death of the parent, we use data from the World
Health Organization for the life expectancy age in China provided per age and gender group. The
stock of savings at death (Savings at death) is then constructed as the stock of savings declared
at the time of the interview plus the monthly savings reported at the interview multiplied by the
years of life expectancy. The measure for total savings at death (Tot savings at death), which also
includes the value of the house, should be the amount of bequest that the child is going to receive.
In addition, in order to be consistent with the model assumption, we construct a measure of the
10Note that the model best corresponds to families with one child, as there may be interactions in multi-children
families not picket up in the model. For this reason, we will provide results for the subsamples of families with one
child and of families with more children in addition to results for the whole sample. For the direct tests of the model
predictions we focus on the sample of families with one child only as this corresponds more closely to the model,
although we provide the corresponding tests for the full sample in the appendix.
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savings at the age of retirement of the parent. Indeed, in the model the parent stops saving when
he/she stops working, therefore we construct a more precise measure for the savings (Tot savings
at retirement). If the respondent is working, we add the value of monthly savings multiplied by
the (expected) years until retirement to the stock of savings. Using information from the sample of
retired individuals, we predict a retirement age per occupation and gender groups. We are aware
that the sample of retired individuals may be different from the sample of non-retired individuals.
However, using different bounds for this predicted retirement age does not change the results. If
instead the respondent is retired, we know their age of retirement and we subtract the monthly
savings multiplied by the number of years from retirement from the stock of savings. We then
construct a measure of the total savings at the age of retirement (Tot savings at retirement) by
adding the value of the house (House) to the stock of savings at retirement (Savings at retirement).
For the assistance provided by the children, we use a specific question which asks the extent of
assistance provided from the child to the parent in daily activities. The questions focus on practical
help in household chores, shopping, meal preparation, laundry.11 For our main analysis we use a
dummy (≤ monthly assistance) that takes value 1 if the child assists the parent daily, weekly, or
monthly. In order to identify the intensive margin of the effect of assistance on bequest, we also
construct other dummies with different extent of assistance. In particular, Daily assistance takes
value 1 if assistance is daily, ≤ weekly assistance takes value 1 if assistance is daily or weekly,
≤ seldom assistance takes value 1 if assistance is daily, weekly, monthly or seldom, No assistance
takes value 1 if the child does not provide any assistance.
Finally, in order to capture the effect of parent and child income, we use specific questions
aimed at addressing this information. In particular, child’s income (Child income) is defined as the
total yearly net income, while for the parent’s income we use either the respondent and his/her
spouse’s yearly net income (HH income) or a combined measure which is the yearly net income of
the respondent if the respondent is working and the yearly net income of the previous job if the
respondent is retired or unemployed (Parent income).
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics for the main variables used for the empirical analysis. All
financial amounts are provided in Chinese Yuan. Summary statistics for the parent’s and the child’s
11We also have some measures of financial management and intervivos that we will use as controls in our analysis.
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main characteristics are shown in Tables 3 and 4.
Table 2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Bequest* 39.64 109.04 0.25 2000 806
Inkind bequest* 16.85 52.20 1.25 1000 877
Intervivos* 8.76 30.62 0 375 910
House* 503.44 887.03 12.5 10000 668
ExpectedBequest* 365.06 746.07 0 10051.25 910
Savings at death* 66.11 166.13 0 2450 910
Savings at retirement* 27.81 81.64 0 1610 910
Tot savings at death* 367.85 757.57 0 10170 910
Tot savings at retirement* 326.58 721.29 0 10089 910
Daily assistance 0.181 0.385 0 1 910
≤ weekly assistance 0.38 0.486 0 1 910
≤ monthly assistance 0.478 0.5 0 1 910
≤ seldom assistance 0.61 0.488 0 1 910
No assistance 0.381 0.486 0 1 910
Child income* 19.17 16.46 1.25 250 887
HH income* 23.88 20.95 6 240 910
Parent income* 14.64 12.85 1.8 120 910
Note: The table displays summary statistics for the main variables used for the empirical
analysis. Bequest is the appropriate amount of bequest that the parent intends to leave
to the child. Inkind bequest is the appropriate amount of inkind bequest intended for the
child. Intervivos are future/intended transfers to the child for education, wedding and
the purchase of the house. House is the value of the house if owned by the respondent.
ExpectedBequest is the sum of Bequest, Inkind bequest, Intervivos and House. Savings at
death is the stock of savings predicted at the time of the (expected) parent’s death. Savings
at retirement is the stock of savings at the time of retirement of the parent. Tot savings
at death is the sum of Savings at death and House. Tot savings at retirement is the sum
of Savings at retirement and House. Daily assistance is a dummy which takes value 1 if
assistance from the child to the parent is daily. ≤ weekly assistance, ≤ monthly assistance,
≤ seldom assistance are dummies which take value 1 if assistance from the child is daily or
weekly; daily, weekly or monthly; and daily, weekly, monthly or seldom, respectively. No
assistance is a dummy which takes value 1 if the child does not provide any assistance to
the parent. Child income is the total yearly net income of the child. HH income is the
respondent and his/her spouse’s yearly net income. Parent income is the yearly net income
of the respondent if the respondent is working and the yearly net income of the previous
job if the respondent is retired or unemployed. Variables* are in thousands.
5 Empirical results
First, we aim at estimating the relationship between expected bequest and assistance. If our
hypothesis that there exists an exchance-based savings motive is correct, higher assistance from a
child should lead to a larger amount of (expected) bequest. Empirically, we test this hypothesis
through the following estimation:
log(ExpectedBequesti) = α1 + α2Assistancei + α3 log(ChildIncomei)+
+ α4 log(ParentIncomei) + α5Xi + µHH + i
(24)
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Table 3: Summary statistics - Parent
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Age 60.67 6.966 50 87 600
Gender 0.405 0.491 0 1 600
No. children 1.517 0.683 1 3 600
No. grandchild 1.312 1.082 0 6 600
Farmer 0.387 0.487 0 1 600
Own business 0.06 0.238 0 1 600
Private firm 0.162 0.368 0 1 600
SOE 0.322 0.468 0 1 600
Other occupation 0.053 0.225 0 1 600
Housewife 0.017 0.128 0 1 600
Retired 0.592 0.492 0 1 600
Unemployed 0.032 0.175 0 1 600
Age at retirement 54.369 5.424 38 68 355
Predicted years to retirement 4.636 3.274 0 12 217
Life expectancy age 21.167 5.676 4 29 600
Spouse information
Farmer 0.33 0.471 0 1 600
Own business 0.048 0.215 0 1 600
Private firm 0.202 0.402 0 1 600
SOE 0.257 0.437 0 1 600
Other occupation 0.032 0.175 0 1 600
Housewife 0.015 0.122 0 1 600
Retired 0.468 0.499 0 1 600
Unemployed 0.028 0.166 0 1 600
No spouse 0.1 0.3 0 1 600
Note: The table displays summary statistics for parent’s characteristics. Age is the age
of the respondent. Gender is a dummy which takes value 1 if the respondent is a male.
No. children and No. grandchildren are the number of children and grandchildren of the
respondent. Farmer, Own a business, Private firm, SOE, Other occupation are dummies
which takes value 1 if the respondent is a farmer, owns a business, works for a private firm,
works for a state-owned enterprise, has another occupation, respectively. Housewife, Retired,
Unemployed are dummies which takes value 1 if the respondent is an housewife, retired or
unemployed, respectively. Age at retirement is the age of the respondent when he/she
retired. Predicted years to retirement are the number of years until retirement predicted
for those individuals who are still working. Life expectancy age is the number of years an
individual is expected to live. The variables for Spouse information are defined in the same
way. No spouse is a dummy which takes value 1 if the respondent does not have a spouse
(widow, single or divorced).
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Table 4: Summary statistics - Child
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Age 36.155 8.331 16 61
Gender 0.504 0.5 0 1
1 sibling 0.396 0.489 0 1
2 siblings 0.214 0.411 0 1
No. children 0.865 0.529 0 3
Married 2.058 2.266 1 7
Co-residence 0.353 0.478 0 1
Elementary school 0.054 0.226 0 1
Middle school 0.384 0.487 0 1
High school 0.318 0.466 0 1
College 0.245 0.43 0 1
N 910
Note: The table displays summary statistics for the child’s characteris-
tics. Age is the age of the child. Gender is a dummy which takes value
1 if the respondent is a male. 1 sibling and 2 siblings are dummies
which take value 1 if the child has 1 or 2 siblings, respectively. No.
children is the number of children of the child. Married is a dummy
which takes value 1 if the child is married. Co-residence is a dummy
which takes value 1 if the child lives with the parent. Elementary school,
Middle school, High school, College are dummies for the highest level of
education of the child.
As mentioned above, the variables are constructed specifically for each child i. The dependent
variable is the measure of expected bequest based on the appropriate amount of bequest (Expect-
edBequest) as described in the section 4. For the assistance from the child to the parent we use
the daily, weekly or monthly extent (≤ monthly assistance). Child income is the net yearly income
of the child (Child income) as defined in section 4. For parent income we use the respondent and
his/her spouse’s yearly net income (HH income). In order to fully control for income effects, we add
second and third order polynomials for both measures of income. We also control for a large set
of both parent’s and child’s characteristics Xi (for the parent: age, age squared, gender, dummies
for both parents’ occupation, number of grandchildren, residence, health expenses; for the child:
gender, age, education, dummy whether the child is married, number of children, dummy whether
the child has siblings). Finally, we introduce household fixed effects (µHH) in order to capture any
within household correlation with the error term.
The results from the estimation of (24) are provided in Table 5. Columns (1) and (2) report the
results for the subsample of only children and of children with at least one sibling. Columns (3) and
(4) report the results for the whole sample without and with the household fixed effects, respectively.
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In column (5) the value of the house (House) from the measure of expected bequest. Finally, column
(6) reports the results from a 2SLS estimation using the residential distance between the parent and
the child as instrumental variable. The measure of the distance is a categorical variable of several
residence locations of the child (household, village, province, ect.). The exclusion restriction for
the instrument relies on the assumption that residential distance should not have any effect on the
amount of bequest expected through other channels than the assistance that is provided by the
child. At the same time, assistance should be strongly correlated with the distance. Given that
we define assistance as help in daily activities, children living closer to the parent should be able
to provide more assistance. Indeed, the F test for the first stage provides evidence for a strong
correlation between the two variables. The exclusion restriction may be more questionable though,
but in lack of better instruments, we provide the results for this regression as evidence of robustness
of our results.
Given our hypothesis, we would expect the sign of α2, i.e. the effect of assistance on expected
bequest, to be positive. From Table 5 we notice that the coefficient for assistance is indeed positive
and statistically significant across all the specifications expect in column (5) where we exclude the
value of the house in the measure of bequest. Therefore, we find that assistance and bequest are
positively correlated, but the relationship seems to rely on the transfer of the house from the parent
to the child.
For completeness, we provide both robust and clustered (at the household level) standard errors
of the estimates. In column (4) we can notice that the estimate for the effect of assistance loses
its statistical significance when using clustered standard errors. We may explain this result due to
the analysis on both only children and siblings in the same estimation. Indeed, for households with
more than one child, there may be some within-cluster error correlation which is not controlled
by the fixed effect and which is then corrected through clustered standard errors. However, this
remaining within-cluster error correlation is not an issue for single-child households, for which the
fixed effects already control for error correlation.12 Indeed, when we run the analysis for the two
separate subsamples (columns (1) and (2)) the statistical significance holds for both robust and
clustered standard errors.
12See Cameron and Miller (2015) for a discussion on cluster specific fixed effects.
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Lastly, we can notice that the IV estimate for the effect of assistance is larger than the OLS esti-
mate. We may explain this result as a local average treatment effect (LATE), implying that children
living closer to the parents do indeed provide more assistance and consequently, get larger bequests.
The larger IV estimate may also suggest a measurement error in the variable for assistance.
Table 5: Bequest and Assistance
dep var:
Exp Bequest Only child Siblings Whole sample Whole sample No house IV
Assistance 0.367 0.546 0.435 0.546 -0.046 2.595
(0.188)* (0.212)** (0.127)*** (0.273)** (0.141) (0.685)***
[0.188]* [0.296]* [0.137]*** [0.380] [0.198] [0.685]***
Child income -26.692 36.503 -10.789 36.503 -0.898 26.303
(19.629) (35.915) (14.744) (46.115) (14.492) (36.921)
[19.629] [50.30] [15.57] [64.53] [19.99] [36.92]
HH income 89.811 81.624
(36.902)** (31.235)***
[36.902]** [34.80]**
Constant -212.569 -87.112 -229.639 -86.593 10.638 -56.953
(141.101) (105.635) (109.914)** (135.718) (43.609) (108.968)
[141.101] [147.8] [121.9]* [189.7] [60.08] [109.0]
Observations 346 538 879 887 887 887
R-squared 0.223 0.732 0.350 0.857 0.941 0.019
Polynomials Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Child+Parent Child Child+Parent Child Child Child
HH Fixed effect No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
F test 15.54
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The dependent variable is the measure of expected bequest based on the appropriate amount of bequest (ExpectedBe-
quest). Assistance is a dummy which takes value 1 if the child assists the parent daily, weekly or monthly. Child income is
the net yearly income of the child, while HH income is the net yearly income of the respondent and his/her spouse. Second
and third order polynomials are included for both measures of income. A set of controls on child’s characteristics are included
in the estimation for all columns. A set of controls on parents’ characteristics are included in the estimation for columns
(1) and (3). For the other columns, household fixed effects are included in the estimation. Columns (1) reports the results
for the subsample of only children. Columns (2) reports the results for the subsamples of children with at least one sibling.
Column (3) and (4) report the results for the whole sample (without and with household fixed effects, respectively). In
column (5) we exclude the value of the house from the measure of expected bequest. Finally, column (6) reports the results
from a 2SLS estimation using as instrumental variable the residential distance between the parent and the child. Unit of
observation is the child. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the household level are in
brackets.
Table 6 reports the results for a similar estimation of (24) using predicted savings at death
(Tot savings at death) as measure of expected bequest. We notice that the coefficient for assistance
is positive and statistically significant for all specifications, except for the specification in column
(5) where we exclude the value of the house in the measure of bequest. Therefore, this alternative
measure provides us with additional evidence that there is a positive relationship between assistance
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and bequest, and that this relationship is hinging on the intergenerational transfer of the house.
Table 6: Bequest and Assistance
dep var:
Tot savings at death Only child Siblings Whole sample Whole sample No house IV
Assistance 0.634 1.468 0.762 1.468 -0.095 3.849
(0.292)** (0.369)*** (0.249)*** (0.474)*** (0.193) (1.080)***
[0.292]** [0.505]*** [0.286]*** [0.648]** [0.272] [1.080]***
Child income -16.366 83.761 16.787 83.761 35.064 71.906
(35.863) (66.414) (22.729) (85.277) (23.264) (68.075)
[35.863] [92.90] [24.21] [119.2] [31.41] [68.08]
HH income 100.263 187.057
(61.884) (56.842)***
[61.884] [69.42]***
Constant -266.294 -220.115 -683.943 -221.875 -92.333 -187.107
(232.851) (196.658) (196.715)*** (252.701) (70.617) (201.747)
[232.851] [274.9] [237.7]*** [352.9] [95.27] [201.7]
Observations 346 538 879 887 887 887
R-squared 0.234 0.781 0.286 0.847 0.991 0.003
Polynomials Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Child+Parent Child Child+Parent Child Child Child
HH Fixed effect No Yes No Yes Yes Yes
F test 15.54
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The dependent variable is the measure of expected bequest based on the stock of savings at the expected death of the parent
(Tot savings at death). Assistance is a dummy which takes value 1 if the child assists the parent daily, weekly or monthly. Child
income is the net yearly income of the child, while HH income is the net yearly income of the respondent and his/her spouse. Second
and third order polynomials are included for both measures of income. A set of controls on child’s characteristics are included in
the estimation for all columns. A set of controls on parents’ characteristics are included in the estimation for columns (1) and (3).
For the other columns, household fixed effects are included in the estimation. Columns (1) reports the results for the subsample of
only children. Columns (2) reports the results for the subsamples of children with at least one sibling. Column (3) and (4) report
the results for the whole sample (without and with household fixed effects, respectively). In column (5) we exclude the value of the
house from the measure of expected bequest. Finally, column (6) reports the results from a 2SLS estimation using as instrumental
variable the residential distance between the parent and the child. Unit of observation is the child. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses. Standard errors clustered at the household level are in brackets.
In the two previous estimations we use a measure of assistance based on relatively frequent
interactions between the parent and the child. Given that we have different levels for the extent
of assistance, we aim at exploring the intensive and extensive margin of assistance on the amount
of bequest. Table 7 reports results using different dummies for assistance in estimating (24). In
particular, column (1) uses a daily assistance dummy, column (2) uses a daily or weekly assis-
tance dummy, column (3) uses a daily, weekly or monthly assistance dummy, column (4) uses a
daily, weekly, monthly or seldom assistance dummy, and finally column (5) uses a no assistance
dummy. The coefficient for assistance is positive and statistically significant (for robust standard
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errors) for the first three measures of frequency. However, the magnitude barely changes across
specifications, implying that an increase in the frequency of assistance does not have a larger effect
on the amount of bequest. On the contrary, when assistance becomes seldom, the effect is still
positive but loses statistical significance and more importantly, the effect of providing no assistance
is negative, though also not statistically significant.13 Therefore, the data confirm our hypothesis
of an intergenerational transfer of assistance from the child in exchange of a larger bequest from
the parent.
Table 7: Bequest and Assistance - intensive and extensive margin
dep var:
Exp Bequest Daily ≤ Weekly ≤ Monthly ≤ Rare No assistance
Assistance 0.579 0.569 0.546 0.262 -0.178
(0.341)* (0.293)* (0.273)** (0.395) (0.394)
[0.475 ] [0.405] [0.380] [0.548] [0.547]
Child income 35.118 35.158 36.503 39.973 39.346
(46.987) (47.705) (46.115) (46.486) (46.679)
[65.864] [66.893] [64.527] [65.060] [65.343]
Constant -82.634 -83.332 -86.593 -96.785 -94.655
(138.214) (140.242) (135.718) (136.768) (137.248)
[193.584] [196.492] [189.733] [191.254] [191.965]
Observations 887 887 887 887 887
R-squared 0.856 0.856 0.857 0.854 0.854
Polynomials Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Child Child Child Child Child
HH Fixed effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The dependent variable is the measure of expected bequest based on the appropriate amount
of bequest ExpectedBequest. Assistance is a dummy which takes value 1 if the child assists the parent
daily (column 1); daily or weekly (column 2); daily, weekly or monthly (column 3); daily, weekly,
monthly or seldom (column 4); child provides no assistance (column 5). Child income is the net
yearly income of the child. Second and third order polynomials are included for child’s income. A
set of controls on child’s characteristics as well as household fixed effects are also included in the
estimation. Unit of observation is the child. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Standard
errors clustered at the household level are in brackets.
After having assessed some evidence in favour of a positive relation between bequest and assis-
tance, we can test the theoretical predictions derived from the model. In particular, we derive two
13Similar results are obtained when using the alternative measure of bequest based on total savings at death (Tot
savings at death).
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theoretical predictions on the relationship between savings and parent’s and child’s income, respec-
tively. The model predicts that parent’s savings are positively correlated with parent’s income, but
negatively correlated with child’s income. We can empirically test these two predictions through
the following estimation:
log(Savingsi) = β1 + β2 log(ChildIncomei) + β3 log(ParentIncomei)+
+ β4Xi + ηi
(25)
The dependent variable is the measure of savings at the age of retirement for the parent (Tot
savings at retirement), as described in section 4. In order to get consistent results with the model
predictions, we run the analysis for the subsample of only children. The results for the whole
sample, as well as for the subsample of children with one or two siblings can be found in the
appendix.
For the parent’s income we use the measure of the current net yearly income if the respondent
is working and the income in the previous job for retired or unemployed respondents. Second and
third order polynomials are included in order to fully capture the relation between income and
savings. We also include a set of controls for child’s and parent’s characteristics. Table 8 reports
the overall effect for child’s and parent’s income, taking into consideration second and third order
polynomials. The first column only estimates the linear effect for income. The second column
estimates both linear and second polynomial for income. The third column estimate linear, second
and third polynomial for income. The Total effect rows show the total income effect for each
estimation: βˆ = βIncome+2βIncome2 ∗Income for the second column; and βˆ = βIncome+2βIncome2 ∗
Income+ 3βIncome3 ∗ Income2 for the third column. From Table 8 we notice that the child income
effect is not statistically significantly estimated in any of the specifications, but the point estimate is
negative when including second and third polynomials, as the theoretical prediction suggests. The
parent income effect is positive regardless of the functional form used for income, and statistically
significant for the linear model, providing evidence in favour of the theoretical predictions. One
reason for the lack of significance may be due to the small sample size used for this analysis.
The empirical evidence for a positive (negative) relation between parent (child)’s income and savings
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Table 8: Income effect on savings
dep var:
Savings at retirement (1) (2) (3)
Child Income 0.109 5.271 -74.324
(0.178) (4.516) (59.028)
2nd Poly -0.290 8.448
(0.257) (6.569)
3rd Poly -0.316
(0.241)
Total effect (child) 0.109 -0.302 -0.512
(0.178) (0.663) (0.925)
Parent income 0.447* 8.081 71.471
(0.265) (4.972) (56.816)
2nd Poly -0.407 -7.207
(0.268) (6.012)
3rd Poly 0.241
(0.211)
Total effect (parent) 0.447* 0.239 0.289
(0.265) (0.518) (0.667)
Constant 19.530 -38.494 3.439
(16.218) (30.517) (229.971)
Observations 346 346 346
R-squared 0.138 0.163 0.183
Polynomials No Yes Yes
Controls Child+Parent Child+Parent Child+Parent
HH Fixed effect No No No
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The table reports the overall effect for child’s and parent’s income on the savings
at retirement (Tot savings at retirement), taking into consideration second and third
order polynomials. The first column only estimates the linear effect for income. The
second column estimates both linear and second polynomial for income. The third
column estimate linear, second and third polynomial for income. The Total effect rows
show the total income effect for each estimation: βˆ = βIncome + 2βIncome2 ∗ Income
for the second column; and βˆ = βIncome + 2βIncome2 ∗ Income+ 3βIncome3 ∗ Income2
for the third column. A set of controls on parent’s and child’s characteristics are also
included in the estimation. The analysis is restricted to the subsample of only children.
Standard errors are in parenthesis.
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also provides support in favour of the correlation between bequest and income. Even though from
the model the effect of income on bequest depends on the relation between saving and income,
nonetheless we can directly test for this relation between bequest and child/parent income. Similarly
to the previous estimation, we run the analysis for subsample of only children. The results for the
whole sample, as well as for the subsample of children with one or two siblings can be found in
the appendix. For the parent’s income we use the measure of the current net yearly income if the
respondent is working and the income in the previous job for retired or unemployed respondents.
Second and third order polynomials are included in order to fully capture the relation between
income and savings. We also include a set of controls on parent’s and child’s characteristics. The
model predicts that child (parent)’s income should be negatively (positively) correlated with the
amount of bequest. Table 9 reports the overall income effect on expected bequest for the child
and the parent, taking into consideration second and third order polynomials. The first column
only estimates the linear effect for income. The second column estimates both linear and second
polynomial for income. The third column estimate linear, second and third polynomial for income.
The Total effect rows show the total income effect for each estimation: βˆ = βIncome + 2βIncome2 ∗
Income for the second column; and βˆ = βIncome + 2βIncome2 ∗ Income + 3βIncome3 ∗ Income2 for
the third column. Again all the coefficients for child income is again insignificant, but we find the
predicted point estimates when including the second and third income polynomial. Moreover, we
find a (significant) positive relation between parent’s income and expected bequest, as predicted
by the model.
Finally, we can investigate the relationship between parent’s and child’s income on assistance.
The model predicts a positive (negative) relation for the parent (child)’s income which we can
evaluate through the following estimation:
Assistancei = γ1 + γ2 log(ChildIncomei) + γ3 log(ParentIncomei)+
+ γ4Xi + ξi
(26)
The dependent variable is the daily, weekly or monthly dummy for assistance (≤ monthly
assistance). Child income is the net yearly income of the child (Child income). For parent income
we use the measure of the current net yearly income if the respondent is working and the income in
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Table 9: Income effect on bequest
dep var:
Exp Bequest (1) (2) (3)
Child income 0.023 1.576 -18.127
(0.111) (1.912) (21.831)
2nd Poly -0.087 2.075
(0.109) (2.395)
3rd Poly -0.078
(0.087)
Total effect (child) 0.023 -0.102 -0.152
(0.111) (0.302) (0.42)
Parent income 0.304** 2.133 22.245
(0.131) (1.989) (23.536)
2nd Poly -0.097 -2.253
(0.107) (2.523)
3rd Poly 0.076
(0.090)
Total effect (parent) 0.304** 0.26 0.278
(0.131) (0.227) (0.297)
Constant 8.243 -7.223 -10.472
(11.911) (16.593) (96.618)
Observations 346 346 346
R-squared 0.191 0.195 0.198
Polynomials No Yes Yes
Controls Child+Parent Child+Parent Child+Parent
HH Fixed effect No No No
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The table reports the overall effect for child’s and parent’s income on expected
bequest (ExpectedBequest), taking into consideration second and third order polyno-
mials. The first column only estimates the linear effect for income. The second column
estimates both linear and second polynomial for income. The third column estimate
linear, second and third polynomial for income. The Total effect rows show the total
income effect for each estimation: βˆ = βIncome + 2βIncome2 ∗ Income for the second
column; and βˆ = βIncome + 2βIncome2 ∗ Income + 3βIncome3 ∗ Income2 for the third
column. A set of controls on parent’s and child’s characteristics are also included in
the estimation. The analysis is restricted to the subsample of only children. Standard
errors are in parenthesis.
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the previous job for retired or unemployed respondents (Parent income). Second and third order
polynomials are included in order to fully capture the relation between income and assistance.
We use the same set of controls for parent’s and child’s characteristics (Xi) as described above.
We run the analysis for subsample of only children. The results for the whole sample, as well as
for the subsample of children with one or two siblings can be found in the appendix. Table 10
reports the results for the estimation of (26). The first column only estimates the linear effect for
income. The second column estimates both linear and second polynomial for income. The third
column estimate linear, second and third polynomial for income. The Total effect rows show the
total income effect for each estimation: βˆ = βIncome + 2βIncome2 ∗ Income for the second column;
and βˆ = βIncome + 2βIncome2 ∗ Income + 3βIncome3 ∗ Income2 for the third column. The effect is
negative for the child’s income and positive for the parent’s income, providing evidence in favor
of an exchange motive and against an altruistic motive for bequest (however, the point estimates
are not statistically significant). Indeed, if parents were exclusively altruistic, we would expect a
negative correlation between the assistance provided by the child and the parent’s income. The
intuition is that children would not need to provide assistance in exchange for a higher bequest,
since they would nonetheless receive a bequest from their altruistic parents. Instead, from our data
we find the opposite evidence that the parent’s income is positively correlated with the assistance
received from the child supporting the hypothesis of an intergenerational transfer through bequest
and assistance.
5.1 Robustness checks
Another source of variation among households which could affect the relation between assistance
and bequest is the extent of assistance provided by grandchildren as well as the income level of the
siblings. In Table 11 we report the results from estimation of (24) using grandchildren’s assistance
as control in columns (1) and (2). We run the analysis for the subsample of only children and
for the whole sample, respectively. The relation between assistance and expected bequest is still
positive and statistically significant, providing further support for the exchange-based motive. In
columns (3) and (4) we restrict the sample to those children who have the same income as their
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Table 10: Income effect on assistance
dep var:
Assistance (1) (2) (3)
Child income -0.033 0.173 0.932
(0.026) (0.483) (5.371)
2nd Poly -0.012 -0.094
(0.027) (0.584)
3rd Poly 0.003
(0.021)
Total effect (child) -0.033 -0.051 -0.050
(0.026) (0.071) (0.103)
Parent income 0.031 -0.243 -3.980
(0.038) (0.673) (9.424)
2nd Poly 0.015 0.415
(0.036) (1.002)
3rd Poly -0.014
(0.035)
Total effect (parent) 0.031 0.046 0.041
(0.038) (0.072) (0.010)
Constant -0.218 -0.064 9.194
(2.731) (4.219) (31.953)
Observations 346 346 346
R-squared 0.193 0.194 0.194
Polynomials No Yes Yes
Controls Child+Parent Child+Parent Child+Parent
HH Fixed effect No No No
Note: The table reports the overall income effect for child’s and parent’s income on
assistance (≤ monthly assistance), taking into consideration second and third order
polynomials. The first column only estimates the linear effect for income. The second
column estimates both linear and second polynomial for income. The third column
estimate linear, second and third polynomial for income. The Total effect rows show
the total income effect for each estimation: βˆ = βIncome + 2βIncome2 ∗ Income for
the second column; and βˆ = βIncome + 2βIncome2 ∗ Income + 3βIncome3 ∗ Income2
for the third column. A set of controls on parent’s and child’s characteristics are
also included in the estimation. The analysis is restricted to the subsample of only
children. Standard errors are in parenthesis.
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siblings, with and without household fixed effects, respectively. As discussed in section 4, different
levels of income across siblings may bias the effect of a specific child on the expected bequest
from the parent. Therefore, focusing on those children with equal income levels, we can mitigate
the potential interactions among sibling’s incomes. The relation between assistance and expected
bequest is positive but not statistically significant14.
Table 11: Robustness Checks
dep var:
Exp Bequest Grandchild assistance Grandchild assistance Same income Same income
Only child Whole sample Siblings Siblings
Assistance 0.343 0.539 0.192 0.108
(0.185)* (0.270)** (0.231) (0.298)
[0.185]* [0.376] [0.270] [0.421]
Child income -28.436 36.836 44.199 -172.921
(19.547) (47.710) (36.076) (1,274.662)
[19.547] [66.777] [40.923] [484.113]
HH income 96.142 23.700
(37.031)*** (65.733)
[37.031]*** [66.898]
Constant -232.464 -85.554 -203.511 486.337
(139.965)* (140.711) (254.062) (3,791.554)
[139.965]* [196.767] [259.083] [1452.356]
Observations 346 879 337 337
R-squared 0.230 0.857 0.331 0.764
Polynomials Yes Yes Yes Yes
Controls Child+Parent Child Child+Parent Child
HH Fixed effect No Yes No Yes
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The dependent variable is the measure of expected bequest based on the appropriate amount of bequest
(ExpectedBequest). Assistance is a dummy which takes value 1 if the child assists the parent daily, weekly or monthly.
Child income is the net yearly income of the child, while HH income is the net yearly income of the respondent and
his/her spouse. Second and third order polynomials are included for both measures of income. A set of controls on
child’s characteristics are included in the estimation for all columns. A set of controls on parents’ characteristics are
included in the estimation for columns (1) and (3). For the other columns, household fixed effects are included in
the estimation. Column (1) and (2) report the results controlling for grandchildren’s assistance for the subsample of
only children and for the whole sample respectively. Columns (3) and (4) restrict the sample to those children who
have the same income as their siblings. Unit of observation is the child. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Standard errors clustered at the household level are in brackets.
6 Concluding remarks
Motivated by the observation of very high saving rates among the elderly in both urban and rural
China, this paper has investigated key aspects of household wealth accumulation in old age and
14When using a different measure of assistance (more frequent) we get statistical significance.
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the potentially involved bequest motives. Based on our unique survey data from different parts of
China, we document that the magnitude of the bequest from parent to child is positively related
to the level of assistance provided by the child for the parent. In accordance with this finding, our
data also suggest that both bequest and assistance increase with the income level of the parent and
decrease with the income level of the child. An additional insight is the finding that accumulated
housing wealth is a crucial part of bequeathed wealth.
Compared to the predictions from a stylized, theoretical overlapping generations model where
bequest and assistance are determined by Nash bargaining between the parent and the child, our
findings of synchronized movements of bequest and assistance support an exchange-based bequest
motive. In contrast, our benchmark case of two-sided altruism implies – according to our simple
model – no such synchronization because assistance is independent of the wage levels of both child
and parent. The latter result is sensitive to the model specification, however. The well-known
model of Cox (1987), for example, builds on the assumptions of downward altruism and utility
functions which are non-separable in consumption and assistance. It then turns out that the signs
of the relationships between assistance and the wage levels of child and parent respectively, are
indeterminate. Thus, we will not make strong claims in the direction of rejecting that altruism
matter for bequests. Our conclusion is the more careful one: The results do indicate that an
exchange-based bequest motive matters for households’ wealth accumulation – and we conjecture
that this motive may potentially work together with both an altruistic motive as well as the effects
of unintentional bequests caused by uncertain lifetimes.
The existence of a significant exchange-based bequest motive has obvious implications for poli-
cies geared towards stimulation of private consumption. Firstly, an improved and extended supply
of publicly provided health care and other services to senior citizens will reduce the need for assis-
tance from the children. Secondly, the development of a larger and more mature domestic credit
market will reduce the reliance of the young generation on bequests and inter-vivos transfers in
order to afford a satisfactory home. A policy-mix combining these measures is likely to diminish
the magnitudes involved in the exchange of assistance for bequest within the family. In turn this
will reduce the saving rates of the elderly.
As discussed in the introduction, the exchange of assistance for bequest is partly rooted in
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culture and social norms. We might therefore expect that the ongoing transformation of the
Chinese society in itself will gradually reduce this exchange. As argued by Lindbeck (1997), norms
and incentives may interact, convincing us that the prescribed policy measures may be forceful
tools in attempts to stimulate household consumption in China.
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Appendix
Table 12: Income effect on savings (whole sample)
dep var: Savings at retirement (1) (2) (3)
Child income -0.456 -11.168 78.853
(0.626) (10.949) (135.208)
2nd Poly 0.606 -9.349
(0.616) (15.031)
3rd Poly 0.363
(0.553)
Total effect (child) -0.456 0.355 0.609
(0.626) (1.47) (2.01)
Parent income 2.684*** 8.073 -6.770
(0.618) (32.326) (33.735)
2nd Poly -0.251 1.013
(1.731) (2.087)
3rd Poly -0.035
(0.057)
Total effect (parent) 2.684*** 3.45 2.79
(0.618) (2.97) (3.14)
Constant -10.557 7.871 -203.520
(7.141) (116.509) (333.243)
Observations 887 887 887
R-squared 0.824 0.828 0.831
Polynomials No Yes Yes
Controls Child Child Child
HH Fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The table reports the overall effect for child’s and parent’s income on
the savings at retirement (Tot savings at retirement), taking into consideration
second and third order polynomials. The first column only estimates the lin-
ear effect for income. The second column estimates both linear and second
polynomial for income. The third column estimate linear, second and third
polynomial for income. The Total effect rows show the total income effect for
each estimation: βˆ = βIncome + 2βIncome2 ∗ Income for the second column; and
βˆ = βIncome+2βIncome2 ∗Income+3βIncome3 ∗Income2 for the third column. A
set of controls on child’s characteristics as well as household fixed effects are also
included in the estimation. The analysis is run on the whole sample. Standard
errors clustered at household level are in parenthesis.
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Table 13: Income effect on savings (siblings)
dep var: Savings at retirement (1) (2) (3)
Child income -0.456 -11.168 78.853
(0.488) (8.534) (105.393)
2nd Poly 0.606 -9.349
(0.480) (11.717)
3rd Poly 0.363
(0.431)
Total effect (child) -0.456 0.274 0.381
(0.488) (1.08) (1.46)
Parent income 1.243** 14.831 6.388
(0.614) (12.532) (11.076)
2nd Poly -0.703 0.022
(0.656) (0.528)
3rd Poly -0.019
(0.016)
Total effect (parent) 1.243** 2.29 2.23
(0.614) (1.3) (1.29)
Constant 5.293* -12.848 -250.656
(2.741) (86.782) (289.283)
Observations 538 538 538
R-squared 0.748 0.754 0.757
Polynomials No Yes Yes
Controls Child Child Child
HH Fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The table reports the overall effect for child’s and parent’s income on
the savings at retirement (Tot savings at retirement), taking into considera-
tion second and third order polynomials. The first column only estimates the
linear effect for income. The second column estimates both linear and second
polynomial for income. The third column estimate linear, second and third
polynomial for income. The Total effect rows show the total income effect for
each estimation: βˆ = βIncome + 2βIncome2 ∗ Income for the second column;
and βˆ = βIncome + 2βIncome2 ∗ Income + 3βIncome3 ∗ Income2 for the third
column. A set of controls on child’s characteristics as well as household fixed
effects are also included in the estimation. The analysis is restricted to the
subsample of children with siblings. Standard errors clustered at household
level are in parenthesis.
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Table 14: Income effect on bequest (whole sample)
dep var: Exp bequest (1) (2) (3)
Child income -0.228 -6.310 39.221
(0.269) (5.642) (66.002)
2nd Poly 0.344 -4.691
(0.322) (7.410)
3rd Poly 0.184
(0.275)
Total effect (child) -0.228 0.232 0.36
(0.269) (0.78) (0.989)
Parent income 1.943*** 25.576* 13.894
(0.330) (13.558) (13.753)
2nd Poly -1.266* -0.160
(0.722) (0.928)
3rd Poly -0.035
(0.029)
Total effect (parent) 1.943*** 2.28 1.93
(0.330) (1.28) (1.29)
Constant -5.462 -87.711* -182.240
(3.746) (46.481) (167.753)
Observations 887 887 887
R-squared 0.847 0.852 0.854
Polynomials No Yes Yes
Controls Child Child Child
HH Fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The table reports the overall effect for child’s and parent’s
income on expected bequest (ExpectedBequest), taking into consider-
ation second and third order polynomials. The first column only
estimates the linear effect for income. The second column esti-
mates both linear and second polynomial for income. The third
column estimate linear, second and third polynomial for income.
The Total effect rows show the total income effect for each estima-
tion: βˆ = βIncome + 2βIncome2 ∗ Income for the second column; and
βˆ = βIncome+2βIncome2 ∗Income+3βIncome3 ∗Income2 for the third
column. A set of controls on child’s characteristics as well as house-
hold fixed effects are also included in the estimation. The analysis
is run on the whole sample. Standard errors clustered at household
level are in parenthesis.
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Table 15: Income effect on bequest (siblings)
dep var: Exp bequest (1) (2) (3)
Child income -0.228 -6.310 39.221
(0.210) (4.398) (51.448)
2nd Poly 0.344 -4.691
(0.251) (5.776)
3rd Poly 0.184
(0.214)
Total effect (child) -0.228 0.186 0.24
(0.210) (0.572) (0.708)
Parent income 0.576** 10.296* 5.160
(0.252) (5.623) (5.465)
2nd Poly -0.501* -0.039
(0.293) (0.268)
3rd Poly -0.013**
(0.007)
Total effect (parent) 0.576** 1.36 1.33
(0.252) (0.606) (0.608)
Constant 7.934*** -12.108 -129.771
(1.300) (40.138) (135.601)
Observations 538 538 538
R-squared 0.714 0.723 0.727
Polynomials No Yes Yes
Controls Child Child Child
HH Fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The table reports the overall effect for child’s and parent’s
income on expected bequest (ExpectedBequest), taking into consid-
eration second and third order polynomials. The first column only
estimates the linear effect for income. The second column estimates
both linear and second polynomial for income. The third column
estimate linear, second and third polynomial for income. The To-
tal effect rows show the total income effect for each estimation:
βˆ = βIncome + 2βIncome2 ∗ Income for the second column; and
βˆ = βIncome + 2βIncome2 ∗ Income + 3βIncome3 ∗ Income2 for the
third column. A set of controls on child’s characteristics as well as
household fixed effects are also included in the estimation. The anal-
ysis is restricted to the subsample of children with siblings. Standard
errors clustered at household level are in parenthesis.
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Table 16: Income effect on assistance (whole sample)
dep var: Assistance (1) (2) (3)
Child income -0.104* 0.737 4.979
(0.063) (0.905) (10.792)
2nd Poly -0.048 -0.517
(0.051) (1.178)
3rd Poly 0.017
(0.042)
Total effect (child) -0.104* -0.168 -0.156
(0.063) (0.131) (0.186)
Parent income 0.091 1.807 0.758
(0.079) (2.962) (2.938)
2nd Poly -0.097 0.002
(0.160) (0.171)
3rd Poly -0.003
(0.005)
Total effect (parent) 0.091 0.021 -0.012
(0.079) (0.282) (0.303)
Constant 0.883 -10.205 -19.128
(0.841) (11.465) (27.319)
Observations 887 887 887
R-squared 0.821 0.823 0.823
Polynomials No Yes Yes
Controls Child Child Child
HH Fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The table reports the overall effect for child’s and parent’s
income on assistance (≤ monthly assistance), taking into con-
sideration second and third order polynomials. The first column
only estimates the linear effect for income. The second column
estimates both linear and second polynomial for income. The
third column estimate linear, second and third polynomial for
income. The Total effect rows show the total income effect for
each estimation: βˆ = βIncome + 2βIncome2 ∗ Income for the sec-
ond column; and βˆ = βIncome+2βIncome2 ∗Income+3βIncome3 ∗
Income2 for the third column. A set of controls on child’s char-
acteristics as well as household fixed effects are also included in
the estimation. The analysis is run on the whole sample. Stan-
dard errors clustered at household level are in parenthesis.
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Table 17: Income effect on assistance (siblings)
dep var: Assistance (1) (2) (3)
Child income -0.104* 0.737 4.979
(0.049) (0.705) (8.413)
2nd Poly -0.048 -0.517
(0.051) (1.178)
3rd Poly 0.017
(0.042)
Total effect (child) -0.104* -0.162 -0.157
(0.063) (0.097) (0.14)
Parent income -0.092 5.664*** 3.805***
(0.067) (1.315) (1.027)
2nd Poly -0.291*** -0.097**
(0.070) (0.043)
3rd Poly -0.007***
(0.002)
Total effect (parent) -0.092 0.473 0.469
(0.067) (0.473) (0.469)
Constant 2.710*** -29.016*** -35.802
(0.402) (7.354) (24.387)
Observations 538 538 538
R-squared 0.701 0.704 0.704
Polynomials No Yes Yes
Controls Child Child Child
HH Fixed effect Yes Yes Yes
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Note: The table reports the overall effect for child’s and parent’s
income on assistance (≤ monthly assistance), taking into considera-
tion second and third order polynomials. The first column only es-
timates the linear effect for income. The second column estimates
both linear and second polynomial for income. The third column
estimate linear, second and third polynomial for income. The To-
tal effect rows show the total income effect for each estimation:
βˆ = βIncome + 2βIncome2 ∗ Income for the second column; and
βˆ = βIncome + 2βIncome2 ∗ Income+ 3βIncome3 ∗ Income2 for the third
column. A set of controls on child’s characteristics as well as house-
hold fixed effects are also included in the estimation. The analysis is
restricted to the subsample of children with siblings. Standard errors
clustered at household level are in parenthesis.
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